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LIMITING THE PROSECUTOR'S USE OF INFORmANTS: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S MISREADING OF DR 7-104(A)(1)
United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988)
In United States v. Hammad, (Hammad 11)1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit limited the prosecutor's abilities to
obtain evidence by construing Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the
American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility2
(DR 7-104(A)(1) or "the rule") to prohibit certain uses by a prosecuting
attorney of informants to communicate with a counselled adverse party
1. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), modifying United States v. Hammad (Hammad 1), 846 F.2d
854 (2d Cir. 1988).
2. DR 7-104(A)(1) provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation
with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the
prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do
so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpoNsmILrrY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1980). For further discussion
of the rule's history and guiding policies, see infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
DR 7-104(A)(1) contains two elements. First, the attorney must communicate to an adverse party
on the subject matter of the representation. AMERCiAN BAR FOUNDATION ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 333 (1979) [hereinafter ABF CODE]. The American Bar Associa-
tion held the rule inapplicable to situations in which an attorney asks an adverse party to supply the
name of a witness after the adverse party's attorney fails to provide such information. ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 66 (1932). The ABA Committee observed that
ascertaining the name of a witness did not constitute a "subject of the controversy." Id.
Second, at the time of communication the attorney must have knowledge of the adverse party's
representation by counsel. ABF CODE, supra, at 338. One court held the rule inapplicable where
federal narcotics agents, unaware that the defendant retained counsel in the federal case, interviewed
the defendant notwithstanding the agents' knowledge of the defendant's representation in a related
state drug prosecution. United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1973). Several com-
mentators argue that DR 7-104(AX1) requires attorneys with knowledge of an adverse party's legal
representation to give advance notice to the suspect's lawyer before contacting the suspect. See, eg.,
Leubsdorf, Communicating With Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Inter-
ests, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 702 (1979). See also Na Cheng Chen v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 537 F.2d 566, 569 (Ist Cir. 1976) (court applies rule when attorney had prior consent of
adverse party's attorney to interview adverse party). But see United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110,
111 (10th Cir.) (rule violated even when party consented to interview without presence of counsel),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). See generally United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th
Cir.) (defendant's attorney must have reasonable opportunity to present himself at interview), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.) (suspect's attorney
must have notice of an interview with his client), cert denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968); Mathies v. United
States, 374 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (agents must notify counsel for accused before interrogat-
ing his client); Kurlantzik, The Prohibition On Communication With an Adverse Party, 51 CONN.
B.J. 136 (1977); Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of a Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the
Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1177-82 (1987).
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during criminal investigations.3
In order to obtain inculpatory information, an Assistant United States
Attorney utilized an informant to meet with Hammad, the target of a
criminal investigation.4 At the meeting between Hammad and the in-
formant, government agents secretly recorded and videotaped their con-
versation.5 Based on the recording and videotape, the grand jury
returned an indictment against the defendants.6 At trial, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ordered the
evidence suppressed because it found that the prosecutor acquired the
videotape and recordings in violation of DR 7-104(A)(1). 7 On appeal,
3. 846 F.2d at 859.
4. Id. at 855-56. The Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, in conjunction with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, investigated an apparent
arson of the Hammad Department Store on November 30, 1985. Id. During the course of the
investigation, an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) discovered that the New York State
Department of Social Services (Department) had audited the store's owners, Taiseer and Eid Ham-
mad, for Medicaid fraud. The audit revealed a fraudulent overcharge of $400,000. The Department
revoked the Hammads' eligibility for Medicaid and demanded immediate repayment of the over-
charge. In their challenge to the Department's determination, the Hammads submitted invoices
falsified by Wallace Goldstein, a supplier to the store. Id.
Goldstein informed the AUSA that he provided the Hammads with false invoices. Government
agents suspected that the Hammads set the fire to destroy actual sales records and conceal the Medi-
caid fraud. Accordingly, the prosecutor shifted the focus of the investigation toward the Hammads.
Goldstein agreed to act as a government informant. The AUSA directed Goldstein to arrange and
record a meeting with the Hammads. Id.
5. Id. at 856. The government agents recorded a telephone conversation in which Goldstein
falsely represented to Taiseer that the government subpoenaed him to appear before a grand jury
investigating Hammads' alleged Medicaid fraud. Taiseer did not deny defrauding Medicaid, but
instead, urged Goldstein to lie to the grand jury and to refuse to produce his sales records. Id.
Five days later, Goldstein met with Taiseer Hammad, and showed him a sham subpoena supplied
by the prosecutor. After accepting the subpoena as genuine, Hammad devised strategies to avoid
complying with it. Government agents recorded and videotaped this meeting. Id.
6. Id. at 856. The grand jury returned a 45 count indictment against the Hammad brothers,
including 38 counts of mail fraud for filing false Medicaid invoices. The grand jury also indicted Eid
Hammad for arson and for fraudulently attempting to collect fire insurance. The grand jury also
indicted Taiseer for obstrnction of justice based on his attempt to influence Goldstein's grand jury
testimony. Id.
7. United States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). At a pre-trial hearing,
Taiseer Hammad moved to suppress the recordings and videotapes. Hammad alleged that the prose-
cutor knew Hammad was represented by counsel, and therefore violated the DR 7-104(A)(1) by
communicating with him through the AUSA's "alter ego," Goldstein. Hammad produced an affida-
vit from his prior counsel, George Weinbaum, stating that Weinbaum represented Taiseer Hammad
at the time of the recordings. Furthermore, Weinbaum testified that he telephoned the AUSA after
the recordings, but before the indictment to inform the government that he "represented Taiseer
Hammad and the Hammad department store." 846 F.2d at 856.
The government unsuccessfully argued that DR 7-104(A)(1) did not apply to criminal investiga-
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the Second Circuit affirmed and held: DR 7-104(A)(1) prohibits a prose-
cutor from communicating with a counselled adverse party during the
investigatory stage of criminal proceedings.'
The sixth amendment gives criminal defendants the right to be repre-
sented by counsel in all criminal prosecutions.9 This constitutional right
matures at least by the "critical stage" of indictment.10
tions, or alternatively, the rule did not apply to investigations prior to the commencement of adver-
sarial proceedings against a defendant. Id. See infra notes 10, 18 and accompanying text.
The district court found that the government "was clearly aware... that [Taiseer] had retained
counsel in connection with this case," and that Goldstein acted as the prosecutor's "alter ego" dur-
ing his discussions with Hammad. 678 F. Supp. at 401. The district court then held that the prose-
cutor had violated DR 7-104(A)(1). Id. See infra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the "alter ego" concept.
The district court, however, limited its holding to instances in which a suspect has retained coun-
sel specifically for representation in the criminal matter made the subject of the prosecutor's investi-
ption. 678 F. Supp. at 401. Furthermore, the government must have knowledge of the
representation. Id. These limitations stemmed from the district court's concern that application of
DR 7-104(A)(1) to criminal investigations could allow criminals to escape undercover investigations
simply by retaining counsel. Id.
8. 846 F.2d at 860. The court also held that the district court may exercise its discretion to
suppress evidence obtained in violation of DR 7-104(A)(1), id. at 860, but chose not to suppress it in
this case. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
9. The sixth amendment commands that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
Massial v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (suppressing defendant's statements made with-
out the presence of counsel after indictment). The sixth amendment protects the layman suspect
who "lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 684-88 (1984) (the sixth amendment right to counsel allows the defendant a fair trial). But
cf Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (state court does not have to appoint counsel for an indigent
where imprisonment is authorized for a particular offense, but is not actually imposed).
10. See W. LAFAVE AND J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 6.4 at 466 (1984). More specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court has held that a suspect is entitled to counsel at or after the time judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (defendant's
right to counsel violated when police officers talk to uncounselled defendant after his arraignment).
The court defined initiating the judicial proceedings as ". . .by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id. The court reasoned that at a "critical stage"
the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. Id. Moreover, at the "critical
stage" the defendant finds himself immersed in the "intricacies" of substantive and procedural crimi-
nal law, and needs the guiding had of an attorney. Id. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
398 (1977) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 689 (1972)); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307-
08 (1973) (accused has no right to counsel at pretrial photographic identification display); Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (assistance of counsel required at every stage of criminal proceeding
which affect substantial rights of accused); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (a suspect's sixth amendment rights attach upon initiation of judicial proceedings);
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2 at 20 (1981).
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DR 7-104(A)(1),11 as a general rule, prohibits lawyers from directly
discussing the subject matter of a controversy with an adverse party
known to have retained legal representation. 2 The rule protects parties
from the imbalance of skill and knowledge between laymen and law-
yers. 3 The drafters of the rule particularly feared that a party con-
fronted by a skilled attorney may unwittingly disclose either privileged
information or a possible claim or defense. 4 In criminal matters, courts
have excluded inculpatory evidence obtained in violation of DR 7-
11. Similar policy concerns anchor the application of both the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel and DR 7-104(A)(1). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Like the sixth amendment, DR 7-104(A)(1) protects a suspect from revealing prejudicial informa-
tion to an adverse lawyer. Both the rule and the sixth amendment illustrate the concern that an
uncounseled defendant should not grope blindly in the adversarial system. See Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985). See generally Note, Applica-
tion of the Impeachment Exception to the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Seeking a Resolution
Based on the Substance of the Right to Counsel, 50 ALB. L. REv. 343, 366-97 (1986). See infra notes
36-40 and accompanying text.
12. Acceptance of this general rule in American jurisdictions dates from the American Bar
Association Canons of 1908. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 9. ("A lawyer
should not in any way communicate with a party represented by counsel; much less should he under-
take to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel."). DR
7-104(A)(1) carried over Ethical Canon No. 9 with little controversy. Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at
685. "States have replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional conduct. As of the
end of 1987, twenty five states have adopted new legal ethics rules patterned on ABA Model Rules,
... [e]leven other states are still in the process of deciding whether to adopt a version of the ABA
Model Rules." M. ScHwARTz & R. WYDICK, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHics (20 ED. 1988).
Because the Hammad court discussed only DR 7-104(A)(1), this Comment will focus on the
Model Code. However, the policies behind DR 7-104(A)(1) have been preserved and codified in
Rule 4.2: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). Thus, the analysis of Rammad would apply in a state
following the never Model Rules.
13. Kurlantzik, supra note 2, at 138. Professor Kurlantzik argues that because of the imbal-
ance in knowledge and skill between a lawyer and a lay adverse party, even well-intended acts of the
lawyer may coerce the party. In other words, this imbalance may induce the adverse party to dis-
close privileged information. Id. at 139. Another commentator observes that this rationale analo-
gies the attorney to a shield protecting the client throughout the litigation and negotiation process.
See Note, Policing Attorneys: Exclusion of Unethically Obtained Evidence, 53 U. CHI. L, REv. 1399,
1407 (1986). See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973) (quoting United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969)) (counsel prevents the defendant from falling into traps devised
by an opposing lawyer); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 211 (1964) (White, J. dissenting)
(discussing the difference in acumen between lawyers and laymen). See generally, ABF CODE,
supra note 2, at 331-39.
14. See Kurlantzik, supra note 2, at 139. See also Massiah v. United States, 307 F.2d 62 (2d
Cir. 1962) rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), (danger of an adverse party being tricked by a
lawyer's artfully contrived questions into filing his case away). Id.
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104(A)(1).I5 However, courts have reached no consensus on which stage
of a criminal prosecution a party is entitled to the protections of the rule.
In United States v. Massiah, 6 the Second Circuit considered the appli-
cability of an earlier version of DR 7-104(A)(1) 17 to the post-indictment
stage of a criminal proceeding.18 The court found the rule inapplicable
when the government agents did not act as the prosecuting attorney's
"alter ego."' 9 The court indicated, however, that had the informant ac-
15. See infra notes 24-27.
Courts often employ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence gathered by unconstitutional
means. The rule's goal is to deter unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officials.
W. LAFAVE AND J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 135 (1984). See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (Court discussed exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on law enforcement officials).
The Hammad I court noted that the use of the exclusionary sanction to remedy a violation of DR
7-104(A)(1) constitutes a permissible exercise of the federal court's supervisory authority over the
bar. 846 F.2d at 857 (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985)).
Like Hammad I, see supra note 8, four other circuits have held that the exclusionary rule applies
to evidence gathered in contravention of DR 7-104(A)(1). United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206,
210 (5th Cir.), certdenied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); United States v. Crook, 502 F.2d 1378, 1380 (3rd
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 211 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
The Hammad I court, however, denied Hammad's motion to suppress the tapes and recordings
obtained through the informant reasoning that the prosecuting attorney would not have his case
prejudiced by the suppression of evidence in such an unsettled area of law. 846 F.2d at 861-62.
For a critique of the application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of DR 7-104(A)(1), see
Uviller, supra note 2, at 1182 ("The complex interests of accurate and probative factual reproduc-
tion, privilege, and the demands of consitutional process that govern the reception of evidence in a
criminal case do not normally take account of the canons regulating professional commitment be-
tween lawyers.").
16. 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
17. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 9 (1908).
18. The Code of Professional Responsibility binds prosecutors and their agents to the same
extent as lawyers in civil cases. United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 1983).
For earlier cases finding DR 7-104(A)(1), and its predecessor Canon 9, applicable to criminal
proceedings see United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110,111 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 412 U.S. 932
(1973); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
See also Uviller, supra note 2, at 1177. See generally, ABF CODE, supra note 2, at 337-39.
Professor Uvilier compellingly argues against applying the rule in criminal matters. He contends
that in criminal investigations, public policy favors full prosecutorial investigation, and that constitu-
tional limitations govern unfair or coercive police methods. He concludes that unthinking applica-
tion of the rule in the criminal setting may achieve "intolerable results" while "undermining" a large
body of sixth amendment law addressing the same issue. Uviller, supra note 2, at 1179.
19. 307 F.2d at 66. Under the alter ego theory, if the prosecutor had knowledge of the govern-
ment agent's contact with the counselled suspect, then the prosecutor violated the rule. Id. See
United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances, Op. 95 (1933)) (municipal attorney responsible for acts of police of-
ficers under his supervision and control).
The Supreme Court has decided a line of cases which presented possible "alter ego" issues, but
avoided addressing the potential ethical difficulties. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986)
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ted as the prosecutor's agent, the prosecutor would have violated the
rule.20 That situation, the court reasoned, would have allowed the prose-
cutor an opportunity to trick the defendant into revealing his defense.
Many courts have found that communications between a suspect and
the prosecuting attorney during the investigatory phase of a criminal pro-
ceeding, including the use of informants, do not implicate the underlying
policy concerns of the rule.21 In United States v. Lemonakis,2" for exam-
ple, the District of Columbia Circuit found no ethical breach when prose-
cuting attorneys used an informant to record conversations with the
defendant at the investigatory stage of a criminal proceeding.3 In so
concluding, the court first distinguished Massiah because the surveillance
in that case took place after the indictment of the suspect.24 The court
noted that before the initiation of adversarial proceedings, a defendant
has no particular defense strategy to reveal to a prosecutor. Further-
more, the court determined that the public's interest in forwarding a
prosecution outweighed a criminal suspect's right to invoke the shield of
the rule to protect the secrecy of his voluntary confession 25 to an under-
(The Court did not consider the ethical questions surrounding an interview of a counselled suspect.);
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 275 n.14 (1980) (raising possible ethical violations in govern-
ment's use of informant, but case decided on other grounds); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
310 (1966) (not considering ethical question in upholding government's use of secret informants).
Professor Uviller noted that if courts examine the alter ego and ethical questions concomitantly they
may undermine this entire body of sixth amendment law. See Uviller, supra note 2, at 1182. See also
supra notes 10, 18 and accompanying text.
20. 307 F.2d at 66.
21. Three federal courts of appeals have refused to apply DR 7-104(A)(1) to curtail a prosecu-
tor's use of informants as agents to gather evidence during a criminal investigation. See United
States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to find that a tape recording of a
suspect made before the initiation of judicial proceedings violated the rule); United States v. Dobbs,
711 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983) (noncustodial interview of suspect prior to the initiation ofjudicial
proceedings did not constitute an ethical breach); United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981) (government's tape recording made in noncustodial environ-
ment prior to suspect's charge, arrest, or indictment did not implicate the ethical problems addressed
by the rule).
22. 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
23. Id. at 956.
24. Id. Following the basic rationale expanded in Massiah, the Lemonakis court reasoned that
at the investigatory stage of a criminal proceeding a prosecutor would gain little from a suspect
through "artful" legal questioning. Id.
25. Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)). This language reflects similar
language in Massiah which pointed to a government agent's "duty" to continue investigating an
indicted suspect. In Lemonakis, government agents recorded several conversations between the de-
fendant and an accomplice turned informant for the government. Id. at 941. The defendant did not
know the conversations were being recorded. Because government agents did not coerce the defend-
ant into revealing information, the court believed that the defendant offered the evidence voluntarily.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/13
19891 LIMITS ON PROSECUTORS' INFORMANTS
cover agent. Thus, the court concluded that premature application of the
rule would impair a prosecutor's use of informants in a criminal
investigation.26
Moreover, several courts have also declined to find a violation of DR
7-104(A)(1) unless a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has
been violated.27 For example, in United States v. Vasquez,28 the Second
Circuit stated in dictum that a government informant's surreptitious re-
cording during an investigation prior to adversarial proceedings did not
violate the suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel.29 The court re-
jected the suspect's argument that because he had retained counsel, the
recording violated the protection afforded by DR 7-104(A)(1).3 ° The
court reasoned that finding a violation of the rule before a suspect's sixth
amendment rights matured would curtail legitimate investigations."'
Thus, under the Vasquez approach, a suspect cannot invoke DR 7-
104(A)(1)'s protection until he has a sixth amendment right to counsel.
In United States v. Jamil,s2 however, the Second Circuit implicitly de-
parted from its analysis in Vasquez. The court held that the govern-
ment's use of an informant to elicit incriminating testimony during a
criminal investigation did not violate DR 7-104(A)(1). 3 1 Relying on the
Massiah rationale, the court in dictum suggested that it would have
Id at 946-47. Therefore, the court found Canon 9 did not protect the defendant's misplaced trust in
whom he confides. Id. at 956.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 18. The basic rationale is that until a suspect's sixth amendment right to
counsel matures, DR 7-104(A)(1) offers no protection. Although most courts have not explicitly
found a nexus between the rule and the sixth amendment, they have implied that the attachment of
sixth amendment rights triggers the application of the rule. One court, however, has specifically
declined to find a violation of the rule before the onset of judicial proceedings. See United States v.
Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983). See also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1366 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (neither the sixth amendment nor the Canons of Legal Ethics provides a basis for exclud-
ing a government informant's taped conversations with a suspect).
28. 675 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 16-17.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id.
32. 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
33. The district court extensively examined the "unity" between the sixth amendment and DR
7-104(A)(1). United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 657 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The district court
concluded that the "two principles are not Siamese Twins and... require different means to effectu-
ate their goals." Id. at 657. In its analysis, the district court compared the scope of the rule to that
of the sixth amendment, observing that those protections afforded by the Constitution represent only
"the minimum historical safeguards." Id. (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340
(1943)). The court noted, however, that the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility articulates a
lawyer's obligation "to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct." Id. Hence, the court
Washington University Open Scholarship
620 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:613
found a violation of the rule had the informant acted as the prosecutor's
alter ego.34 Thus, if the prosecutor used informants to gather evidence
against the defendant, DR 7-104(A)(1) might be violated even though
the suspect's sixth amendment rights had not attached.
35
Contrary to the approach taken by earlier cases, in United States v.
Guerrerio,36 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
concluded that DR 7-104(A)(1) does not apply to the investigatory phase
of a case.37 The Guerrerio court reasoned that DR 7-104(A)(1), like the
sixth amendment right to counsel, lends balance to an adversarial rela-
tionship which does not yet exist in the investigatory phase of a criminal
proceeding. 38 Thus, the court predicted, application of the rule to inves-
tigations would render it devoid of meaning and confuse its scope. 39 The
concluded that the duties prescribed by the Code remain operative even when a suspect's sixth
amendment rights have not yet matured. Id. at 657-58.
For other cases in the Second Circuit finding DR 7-104(A)(1) violations in the absence of a sixth
amendment violation, see United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1161 (1985) (pre-arraignment interview of suspect by prosecutor's agents violated the rule);
United States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1223, 1224 n.3 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 675
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982) (government's use of an informant to elicit incriminating statements from a
suspect found unethical, although not violative of the sixth amendment). For further discussion of
the sixth amendment's relationship with DR 7-104 (A)(1) see infra notes 36-48 and accompanying
text.
34. Id. at 646. The court held that DR 7-104(A)(1) did not apply because the prosecutor "was
not privy to the electronic arrangements attending the investigation." Id. See also supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
35. Id. The court in Vasquez did not reach the alter ego issue, because sixth amendment rights
had not yet attached. 675 F.2d at 17. Whether or not the prosecutor knew of the informant's
activity, DR 7-104(A)(1) simply would not apply in that situation.
36. 675 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Guerrerio, the defendant invoked DR 7-104(A)(1)
to suppress conversations recorded by the prosecutor's informant at the pre-indictment stage, before
maturation of sixth amendment rights.
37. Id. at 1438.
38. Id. The court observed that both the sixth amendment and the rule guarantee balance and
fairness "in our adversarial system of justice." Id. at 1437. The court identified this broad policy
inherent in the adversarial relationship between defendant and prosecutor as the nexus between the
sixth amendment and the rule. The Guerrerio court declined to follow Vasquez. The court found
Vasquez of little precedential value for two reasons. First, Vasquez suggested a nexus between sixth
amendment rights and DR 7-104(A)(1) only in dictum. Second, because the Vasquez decision was a
summary order the Second Circuit rules accord it no precedential value even though the court pub.
lished the order in a per curiam opinion. Hence, because Vasquez only cursorily addressed the
relationship of the sixth amendment and DR 7-104(A)(1) in dictum of a per curiam opinion, the
Guerrerio court is at least arguably the first court to substantively make this connection.
39. Id. at 1438. The court emphasized language in the rule to illustrate this point. Id. The rule
prohibits an attorney from communicating with an adverse party on the "subject of representation."
The "subject matter" of a case, however, remains nebulous before the beginning of adversarial pro-
ceedings. Id. Accordingly, because a suspect has no substantial "subject matter" to discuss with a
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court suggested that although the rule and the sixth amendment serve
different functions, the policies fundamental to each apply simultane-
ously at the indictment stage of a criminal proceeding.'
In United States v. Hammad, (Hammad 1)41 the Second Circuit de-
parted from Massiah and its progeny and held that during the investiga-
tory stages of a criminal proceeding, DR 7-104(A)(1) prohibits a
prosecutor from communicating with an adverse party represented by
counsel.42 The court rejected the government's argument that the rule is
coextensive with the sixth amendment, and thus remains inoperative un-
til the onset of adversarial proceedings.43
In making this determination, the court first discussed a series of dis-
trict court decisions in the Second Circuit which analyzed the rule apart
from the sixth amendment." The court then discussed the separate pur-
poses of the sixth amendment and DR 7-104(A)(1). 45 The Constitution,
the court reasoned, provides a minimum standard of protection.4 6 The
rule, on the other hand, establishes an attorney's duty to maintain the
highest standards of ethical conduct.47 Thus, because DR 7-104(A)(1)
defines an attorney's relationship with his client and adverse parties, it
contemplates protections broader than those of the Constitution.
48
The court, however, shared the government's concern that such a
broad reading of the rule could allow criminals with permanent counsel
to immunize themselves from infiltration by informants.49 To remedy
this concern, the Hammad I court prescribed two limitations on the
prosecutor before the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, application of the rule would
render its language meaningless. Id. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. For this reason,
the Guerrerio court found a principled and logical connection between DR 7-104(A)(1) and the sixth
amendment.
40. 675 F. Supp. at 1438.
41. 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 860.
43. Id. at 858. The court refused to trigger the application of the rule upon an indictment. Id.
at 859. The court expressed concern that a prosecutor could delay seeking an indictment so that he
could continue eliciting statements from a suspect in violation of the rule. Id. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
44. Id. at 858-59.
45. Id. at 859. The court found that the sixth amendment and the disciplinary rule serve "sepa-
rate, albeit congruent purposes." Id.
46. Id. The court stated that the Constitution prescribes a floor below which protections may
not fall, rather than a ceiling beyond which they may not rise. Id.
47. Id. See supra notes 12-14 & 33 and accompanying text.
48. 846 F.2d at 859. See supra note 33.
49. 846 F.2d at 859. The court wanted to impose "adequate safeguards without crippling law
enforcement." Id. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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rule's scope.5" First, the court restricted the rule's application to cases
where the prosecutor knows51 that, but for the pending investigation, the
suspect would not have retained counsel.52 This limitation, the court
reasoned, would prevent a suspect from retaining permanent counsel to
shield himself from any potential contact with government informants.
Second, the court posited the Massiah "alter ego" theory as an addi-
tional restriction on DR 7-104(A)(1). 5 3 In situations where the prosecu-
tor does not actually contact the suspect, the rule would be inapplicable
if the informant has only a tenuous relationship to the prosecutor. 54 The
court stated that the "alter ego" limitation restricts the rule's application
to circumstances in which a suspect risks "being tricked by a lawyer's
artfully contrived questions into giving his case away. '"55
Finally, after affirming the lower court's conclusion that the prosecu-
tor violated the rule, the Second Circuit, notwithstanding the govern-
ment's request, declined to enunciate a bright line rule.5 6 Instead, the
court gave broad discretion to district courts to define the scope and ap-
plication of DR 7-104(A)(1) on a case-by-case-basis, and so perform their
duty to supervise the bar.57
Recognizing the inherent inadequacies in Hammad 1,58 the Second
50. 846 F.2d at 859. The Second Circuit relied heavily on the district court's rationale in pre-
scribing these limitations. See Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). See also supra note 7.
51. 846 F.2d at 859. For a prosecutor to "know" about representation, the defendant must
notify the government that counsel represents him. The court stated it would require "far more
precise notice" before it would enforce the rule against a prosecutor conducting an investigation. Id.
The court, however, did not specify when or how a suspect should give notice.
52. Id.
53. Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
54. 846 F.2d at 859.
55. Id. (quoting Massiah, 307 F.2d at 66).
56. 846 F.2d at 860.
57. Id. (citing Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1977)). The court illustrated two
extreme situations in which the rule might and might not apply to prohibit a prosecutor's activity.
846 F.2d at 860. For instance, a "clandestine interrogation" by a prosecutor would clearly violate
the rule, whereas an informant's release of incriminating information to a prosecutor who had no
foreknowledge of the informant's activities would not. Id.
58. By failing to specify how and when a suspect should notify the prosecutor of his representa-
tion, the court made it possible for suspects with permanent counsel to effectively shield themselves
from informant infiltration by manipulating the quality and timing of their notice. Thus the court
protected the secrecy of the suspect's "voluntary confession at the expense of the public interest in
the prosecution." See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. Further, the court in Hammad I
suggested that the prosecutor's use of an informant pre-indictment violates DR 7-104(A)(1). See
supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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Circuit reheard and modified it in Hammad 11.19
The court recognized that the use of informants constitutes a legiti-
mate investigatory technique.' However, the court restricted their use
by holding that DR 7-104(A)(1) prevents a prosecutor from using "art-
fully contrived" devices or other "egregious misconduct" to reach a sus-
pect via an informant.6" The court "cited" the use of a sham subpoena,
as used in Hammad I & II, as an example of such a device.62 Such prac-
tices violate DR 7-104(A)(1) by transforming the informant into the
prosecutor's "alter ego". 63 Despite this clarification, the court, as in
Hammad I, left the policing of prosecutorial activities to the district
court on a case by case basis."
In the two Hammad cases, the Second Circuit significantly expanded
the scope of DR 7-104(A)(1), which, in practice, may circumscribe a
prosecutor's ability to use informants during a criminal investigation.
However, in construing the rule's application so broadly, the court over-
looked the rule's central policy.6" The purpose of DR 7-104(A)(1) is to
deter prosecutors from contacting suspects who have retained counsel,
not to impede the prosecutor's ability to ferret out crime.
While the court correctly ascertained the conceptual distinctions be-
tween DR 7-104(A)(1) and the sixth amendment,66 it failed to demon-
strate why one should apply to criminal investigations and the other
should not.67
The American Bar Association crafted the rule to protect adverse par-
ties from revealing possible claims or defenses to an opposing attorney.68
If, however, a prosecutor has not initiated adversarial proceedings
against a suspect,69 the suspect has little or no case strategy to reveal.
59. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). Hammad II adapted Hammad I's analysis of DR 7-104(A)(1)
to a criminal investigation except for those changes in the text accompanying notes 60-64.
60. Id. at 839.




65. See supra notes 2, 8-12 and 58-64 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
67. Although the court observed that the sixth amendment and the rule are based on similar
principles and have similar characteristics, it did not illustrate these similarities, nor did it articulate
the underlying policies fundamental to each. Rather, the Hammad court cursorily analyzed the
scope of a Constitutional precept versus that of an ethical canon. See supra note 33 and accompany-
ing text.
68. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 10, 39-41 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the court's revisions in Hammad II merely confused the
applicability of DR 7-104(A)(1) to criminal investigations. Although the
court correctly perceived that Hammad I could severely limit a prosecu-
tor's ability to use informants, 71 the court's new standard fails to offer a
useful solution to the problem.
First, the court misread and misapplied Massiah and its progeny.
Massiah held that the alter ego doctrine applies if the prosecutor knew of
both the informant's activities and the suspect's representation by coun-
sel.72 The court undermined established law by substituting the "egre-
gious conduct" standard for Massiah's knowledge requirement in
determining if the informant is the prosecutor's "alter ego."
73
Second, in its attempt to rectify the problems created by the poorly
reasoned Hammad I decision, the court perverts the language of DR 7-
104(A)(1). The rule focuses on whether the attorney communicated with
a represented adverse party.74 It makes no mention of the attorney's
conduct.75 Yet the court found that "egregious conduct" triggers appli-
cation of the rule.76 Compounding this error is the failure of the court to
define the term "egregious conduct." Hence, the court has replaced the
plain language of the rule with an imprecise standard that only compli-
cates the determination of whether a prosecutor violated the rule.
The Hammad II court's application of DR 7-104(A)(1) to the investi-
gatory stage of criminal proceedings may severely curtail criminal inves-
tigations. Prosecutors will face the dismal choice of either abandoning
the use of informants in criminal investigations, 77 or chancing crucial
evidence obtained through informants to the district courts' varying in-
terpretations of the Hammad II court's ambiguous application of the
rule.
78
The court's revision in Hammad II further confused the law in the
70. See supra notes 21-26 and 36-40 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
72. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 2.
75. Id.
76. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
77. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Second Circuit. One can only hope the Second Circuit in a future case
will reevaluate its misplaced application of DR 7-104(A)(1).
D.JS.
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